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Abstract 
The EU is bound to respect the national identities of Member States. States might, at occasions, 
define their national identities in ways that breach inclusive constitutional values (e.g. 
equality) protected under TEU Article 2. The assumption behind the recognition of diverse 
constitutional identities is the peaceful coexistence of both, which is challenged by illiberal 
national developments. Instead, we see a zero-sum game between the constitutional 
recognition of exclusive values (e.g. dominant ethnicity or religion) and inclusive constitutional 
values; every gain by the proponents of emergent authoritarianism translates to a loss on the 
side of constitutional democracy. While exclusive norms appear in virtually every constitutional 
system, a critical mass of exclusive values can lead to the hollowing out of a democratic order, 
both on the national and on the supranational level. To try to draw the line where this shift 
happens, we are relying on the limits of toleration, and recognition, of exclusive norms and 
identity elements of minority communities in liberal theories of multiculturalism (e.g. Raz, 
Taylor, Kymlicka). We think that the case of illiberal minorities raise structurally similar 
theoretical questions, insights, and experiences than the dilemma defined above, the challenge 
of illiberal Member States undermining EU fundamental values. 
 1 
Introduction 
In this article, we present a normative framework that is applicable to the dilemma raised by 
the anti-constitutionalist challenge in the European Union. We propose using basic tenets of 
liberal theories of multiculturalist politics as a background theory. Our central claim in this 
article is that there are valuable lessons to be learnt from the parallel drawn between the 
‘illiberal challenge’ in the EU and the problem posed by illiberal minorities in liberal 
multicultural states. 
The key challenge the European Union faces is framed in this article as ‘anti-
constitutionalism’. We deliberately opt for this term instead of ‘illiberalism’, ‘populism’, 
‘authoritarianism’ or other labels, because we think that this captures best the difficulty that 
public law faces in illiberal Member States, e.g., Hungary. Such states reject pluralism, often 
along with equal dignity. As a result, they end up undermining the democratic rule of law and 
human rights, the foundations upon which constitutionalism rests.1 The challenge parallels 
the classical liberal dilemma concerning the limits of tolerance. Our starting assumption is that 
liberal multiculturalism, the theoretical approach we rely on in this article, offers clues for 
demarcation. 
We agree with those who think that the institutions of liberal democracies—and inclusive 
constitutional values—are worthy of protection. As János Kis states: ‘The values of liberal 
democracy are true and attractive ideas.’2 The most persuasive argument for this statement 
today might be to look at its recent alternatives, like left- or right-wing illiberal regimes outside 
and inside the European Union, e.g., the illiberal systems of Venezuela or Hungary.3 Further, 
we agree with those proponents of multiculturalism who argue for the importance of the 
equal recognition of individual and group identities, and hence the need for the politics of 
multiculturalism, because we think a society blind to difference is, a discriminatory society. 
In the following pages we first sketch a legal framework based on key provisions of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) and present possible interpretations of their relationship. Second, 
we seek to understand this relationship through a reading of the underlying theoretical 
foundation based on the distinction between exclusive and inclusive constitutional values. The 
hypothesis that underlies our discussion is that there is a zero-sum game between the 
constitutional recognition of exclusive constitutional values (ethnicity, religion, etc., of the 
dominant population) and inclusive constitutional values (e.g., equality, human dignity, 
human rights).4 This does not mean, however, that a certain level of exclusive values cannot 
be tolerated. It is empirically true that liberal democracies maintain a commitment to some 
exclusive values (favouring certain cultures in the form of language, ethnicity, religion). This 
raises the question of the extent to which this can be justified. We argue that some level of 
 
1 This also means that we do not disagree with other labels, we just think ‘anti-constitutionalism’ is particularly 
useful for the context of this article. We find the descriptions and explanations going back to Anti-Enlightenment 
sentiments and the category of electoral authoritarianism particularly applicable, in a broader sweep. See Zeev 
Sternhell, Les anti-Lumières: Une tradition du XVIIe siècle à la guerre froide (Fayard, 2006) (in English: The Anti-
Enlightenment Tradition (Yale Oxford University Press, 2009); and Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: 
Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford University Press, New York, 2013). 
2 János Kis, Alkotmányos demokrácia [Constutional Democracy] (Kalligram, Budapest, 2019), 14. 
3 Ibid. 
4  For more details, see Zsolt Körtvélyesi and Balázs Majtényi, ‘Game of Values: The Threat of Exclusive 
Constitutional Identity, the EU and Hungary,’ German Law Journal 18, no. 7 (2017): 1721–44. 
 
toleration for exclusive values can be normatively acceptable. We argue that multiculturalist 
theories can provide useful insights for conceptualising conflicts between constitutional 
values. 
In this article we briefly discuss how our approach relates to legal pluralist discussions, 
maintaining that—including multiculturalist accounts—it enriches the pluralism debate. More 
specifically, we think that reliance on liberal multiculturalism strengthens the normative layer 
in that it values the recognition of group identities as a means to individual well-being and 
dignity, while it presents homogenisation as an inherent loss that should be justified. 
Finally, we assess the possible implications of applying this approach. The article concludes 
that multiculturalist accounts justify liberal interference under certain circumstances. Such 
accounts can help conceptualise the enforcement of Article 2 TEU values and their relationship 
to the protection of Member State national identities in Article 4(2) as well as assessments 
under Article 7 TEU. 
The Dilemma 
In line with Article 4(2) TEU, the EU is bound to respect the national identity of Member States 
‘inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and 
local self-government.’5 Besides Article 4(2), the 6th recital of the Preamble also mentions 
respect for history, culture, and traditions of Member States. These provisions of the Treaty 
protect not only constitutional structures that express constitutional identity, but also the 
cultural and historical roots of national identity.6 Thus, just like their constitutional structure, 
Member States can define their national identity in differing ways, including approaches that 
may breach inclusive constitutional values like equality or dignity. Even so, the implications of 
transforming the Member States’ national identities raise legitimate concerns for inclusive 
values that are labelled as fundamental and protected as such by Article 2: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. […] 
It is important to note that there is no established hierarchy in the text of the Treaty between 
Article 4(2) and Article 2. The codification of what is now Article 2 has been an important step 
in making certain background assumptions of European integration and cooperation fully 
explicit. The Article lists the content of key commitments, the lack of which would undermine 
the functioning of the EU.7 In summary, Article 2 values as a whole are essential for the 
 
5 ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government.’ Article 4(2) TEU. 
6 Leonard F. M. Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon,’ Utrecht Law Review 6 
(2010): 43. 
7 Kochenov (‘The Acquis and Its Principles…,’ 24–25 and 26) warns against “too much” focus on values, i.e., an 
overly demanding value-based scrutiny could undermine the logic of EU law prominently not based on (direct) 
reciprocity. Article 2 in fact underlines the background assumptions of mutual trust and general reciprocity in 
that all Member States are presumed to share a basic commitment to Article 2 values—the point we are making 
above. 
 
functioning of the EU. 8  The Article lists the fundamental values of the European Union, 
including the value of human rights protection that is further specified in Article 6(3) with 
reference to the ECHR as resulting ‘from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States’ (emphasis added). 9  Again, Member State societies should share these values. In 
addition, Member States should engage in ‘sincere cooperation’ actively ensuring 
membership obligations and avoid undermining integration under Article 4(3).10 Pluralism is 
also mentioned in Article 2, the second sentence of which states that the values quoted earlier 
‘are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’ Pluralism is also 
protected on another level. Integration is limited and is certainly not all-encompassing as 
stressed in Articles 4(1),11 5(2),12 and partly 4(2), ensuring leeway in non-covered areas. 
As is the case with legal rules, cases of (alleged) violations provide the true test for the 
workability of this framework. The Hungarian and Polish cases should be enough to 
demonstrate that the assumption of peaceful convergence has been debunked. As such we 
are basically forced to confront the question of how to conceptualise the connection between 
Articles 2 and 4(2). As a rudimentary classification, we can identify two logical endpoints.  
What we could call the universalist reading maintains the primacy of Article 2 under all 
circumstances. Here Article 4(2) allows any deviation—regarding the means or other 
technicalities—only within the field marked by Article 2, rendering the respect for national 
identity to little more than a decorative detail.13 The other, which we now call the relativist 
(or strong pluralist) reading, assures the primacy of Article 4(2). Under the latter reading 
Article 2 serves as a menu, and Member States (the customers) are relatively free to define 
their diet by vetoing particular items that would somehow clash with respect for their national 
identity. To make this more plausible, a formal interpretation of democracy and the rule of 
law should be maintained, but in terms of actual conceptualisation wide variation is allowed 
on the national level. 
Under the first reading, Article 4(2) may only work within the boundaries set by Article 2; after 
all, this is why they are cast as foundational values. This is supported by the wording (‘The 
Union is founded on…’) as well as the history and will behind the text. What this description 
 
8 The values listed are also fundamental because, crucially, Article 2 does not refer to market economy, economic 
integration, or a common market. Reference to the ‘internal market’ in Article 3(3) comes only after an ‘ever 
closer union’ in Article 1, the listing of values in Article 2, ‘peace’ in Article 3(1), and the ‘area of freedom, security 
and justice’ in Article 3(2). This confirms the historical account that the common market should be seen as the 
economic-practical means toward historical-political goals—a point beyond the scope of the present article. For 
the (corrective) historical account, see Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global 
Human Rights Actor,’ American Journal of International Law 105 (2011): 649. 
9  ‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.’ Article 6(3). 
10 ‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.’ Article 4(3). 
11 ‘In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States.’ Article 4(1). 
12 ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon 
it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon 
the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.’ Article 5(2). 
13 We have noted earlier that the case law of the clause in question does little to repudiate this reading. See no. 
12 above. 
 
fails to capture, however, is that the exact meaning of these values remains contested.14 
When defining their content, interpretation will necessarily rely on existing practices in EU 
Member States and would face the same dilemma of having to draw the line somewhere 
between permissible and impermissible state practices. Accordingly, these values are not 
items on a menu, and selectivity is not possible. This approach is partly due to the fact that 
textual interpretation of the Article does not support such a reading. It maintains that all of 
the values listed should be read together, in light of an all-encompassing moral framework,15 
e.g., under the mainstream position holding each of them is conceptually underpinned by 
respect for human dignity,16 where violation of one value goes against the entire framework. 
Intermediary readings between the two logical endpoints are also available. For example, we 
can adopt an equalising or pluralist reading: the two clauses are on the same level, without 
(clear) hierarchy. However, to make this a workable approach we have to provide a 
background theory on how to resolve possible conflicts on a case-by-case basis. Inherent in 
several readings (e.g., that cited above on undermining the functioning of the EU17) is a 
functionalist philosophy: the goal of Article 2 is to guarantee the foundational values without 
which the EU cannot function; and whatever does not undermine integration is tolerated 
under Article 4(2). Even so, functionalism is not self-explanatory and self-validating. We need 
a normative approach that sets out the goals of integration in relation to which we can tell 
which functions we seek to protect. What is clear under these readings is that recognition in 
Article 4(2) comes with limits. It is not a blank check, and we need a coherent framework to 
decide when divergence is permissible. 
Another field where the same tension has erupted is the debate on (constitutional) pluralism. 
The central question this field grapples with falls within the parameters of our inquiry: can a 
normative core justify limiting pluralism and how far can this core extend? In Joseph H.H. 
Weiler’s words: any constitutional regime has ‘both the pluralist and hierarchical combined—
though one can have endless debates on the appropriate dosages of each.’18 As a matter of 
descriptive pluralism, the EU’s Article 2 embodies this normative core that should be 
‘common’ to all Member States, as we have seen. Normatively, without a common core, 
pluralism would fall back to radical pluralism—an unappealing scenario for European 
 
14 On ‘essentially contested concepts’, see Walter Bryce Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts,’ Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955–1956): 167–98. For a recent account on democracy specifically, see John S. 
Dryzek, ‘Can There Be a Human Right to an Essentially Contested Concept? The Case of Democracy,’ Journal of 
Politics 78, No. 2 (2016): 357–67. 
15  See, e.g., Dworkin’s arguments: Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Oxford University Press, 
Cambridge/London, 2011) and, earlier, Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American 
Constitution (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996). 
16 Catherine Dupré, Dignity, Democracy, Civilisation, Liverpool Law Review 33, 263–280 (2012). For an overview, 
see Alexandra Timmer, Balázs Majtényi, Katharina Häusler, and Orsolya Salát, EU Human rights, democracy and 
rule of law: from concepts to practice, (2014) FRAME Deliverable 3.2, available at <http://www.fp7-
frame.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/10-Deliverable-3.2.pdf.> 
17 To cite one such phrase from the literature: ‘the failure to enforce the values of the Union will most likely result 
in the undermining of the core acquis going to the heart of EU law and is not solely confined to the internal 
market’. Kochenov, ‘The Acquis and Its Principles…,’ 10. 
18  Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism – Some Doubts,’ in The Worlds of 
European Constitutionalism, eds. Gráinne de Búrca and Joseph H. H. Weiler (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2011), 17. 
 
integration. Mattias Kumm describes this as a realm ‘where actors of each legal order proceed 
without systemic regard for the coherence of the whole.’19 
It is clear that pluralism also needs ‘a doctrinal framework that defines the conditions under 
which either institutionalized civil disobedience or constitution-based conscientious objection 
are justified.’ 20  For Kumm, ‘Constitutionalism establishes a framework of principles that 
provide the grounds and limits of legal authority of any legal order within the liberal 
democratic tradition.’21 One can ask what happens with legal orders outside this tradition.22  
Matej Avbelj argues that ‘any Member State which in defence of its own autonomy, invokes 
the pluralist structure of the Union, can only do so after it has given effect to pluralism within 
its own constitutional polity.’23 In a similar vein, pluralism on the European level presupposes 
pluralism on the national level, just as pluralism in a liberal multicultural state presupposes 
pluralism on the level of the territorial units (e.g., federated member states) of the state. 
In a sense, our overview runs parallel to these pluralist analyses. Multiculturalist theories 
might be more in line with increasingly permissive pluralist approaches in that they 
acknowledge the worth of giving due recognition to community values, even in the case of 
non-liberal entities. But these theories also stop short of granting such regimes a free hand. 
To this point we have discussed the question of how the tension can be tackled conceptually. 
However, there is also an institutional and procedural question. Article 7 TEU is about 
determining ‘the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values 
referred to in Article 2’.24 This procedure could, in principle, lead to the suspension of ‘certain 
of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, 
including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in 
the Council,’25 if a breach of the fundamental values of the EU is established. As events in 
Hungary, to a degree Romania, and lately in Poland have given us clear cases of breaching the 
rule of law—all the while the workability of Article 7 is very much in doubt 26 —most 
 
19 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism Defining the Domain of Legitimate Institutional 
Civil Disobedience and Conscentious Objection,’ in Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law, eds. Julie 
Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), 217. 
20 Kumm, ‘The Moral Point…,’ 238. 
21 Kumm, ‘The Moral Point…,’ 242. 
22 The type of pluralism that Kumm puts forward makes it impossible to conceptualise pluralism as encompassing 
both liberal and non-liberal, constitutionalist and anti-constitutionalist legal systems. See his discussion on the 
monist features of his pluralism in Kumm, ‘The Moral Point…,’ 244–45. ‘[T]he world of public law is imagined as 
constituted and held together by a shared commitment to constitutional principles’ (Ibid.), so a rejection of these 
principles pushes one out of this ‘world of public law’. 
23 Matej Avbelj, ‘Pluralism and Systemic Defiance in the EU,’ in The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring 
Member States’ Compliance, eds. Jakab, András, and Dimitry Kochenov (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2017), 57. Also: ‘[…] pluralism cannot be defied pluralistically. A pluralist European integration assumes that its 
Member States are well-ordered societies. After all, this is what the entire process of pre-accession conditionality 
is dedicated to. A pluralist European integration can therefore only exist if its Member States are ab initio 
committed to pluralism.’ Ibid. at 56–57. 
24 Article 7(2) TEU. 
25 Article 7(3) TEU 
26 See debate on whether Article 7 is a ‘nuclear option’. The 2011 edition of the Craig-de Búrca book declares 
‘despite the symbolism of Article 7 TEU, and a number of attempts which have been made by the European 
Parliament to instigate its application, it seems unlikely to have any significant application in practice.’ Paul Craig, 
and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011), 390. 
 
commentators have focused on the question of ‘how’.27 Proposals have been prepared for 
rendering Article 7 workable, 28  for reforming the procedure, 29  or for circumventing it 
altogether.30 Instead of revisiting this debate, we focus on the conceptualisation of the above-
mentioned values and their relationship to pluralism—most notably to Member State 
divergence—and the question of justifying the override of Member State commitments in the 
case of conflict.31 
Before we present our analogy and point out how multiculturalist readings show important 
parallels with constitutional practice—and thus provide insights into a possible approach to 
reconcile the conflict arising from variation and establish the limits of recognising diversity—
we first need to differentiate between two sets of values: exclusivity and inclusivity. The 
distinction is important in understanding where the dilemma originates and where 
justifications for liberal interference are more likely to succeed. 
A Clash of Constitutional Values 
Constitutional values refer to abstract ethical norms that are binding; their ultimate goal is the 
interpretation of constitutional documents.32 National identities and values are not identical, 
but specific values establish the core of a shared national identity.33 In our interpretation 
inclusive constitutional values are able to integrate the interests of all members of a political 
community: they treat all members as morally equal and as a result strengthen constitutional 
democracy. Exclusive constitutional values, however, protect only the ethnic, cultural, 
political, religious, and other identity elements of one or more dominant groups within a 
society—usually the identity elements of the majority population. They question the equality 
 
27 For an overview of seven key proposals from systemic infringement procedures to reverse Solange, see Dimitry 
Kochenov, ‘The Acquis and Its Principles. The Enforcement of the ‘Law’ versus the Enforcement of ‘Values’ in the 
EU,’ in The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance, eds. Jakab, András, and 
Dimitry Kochenov (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017), 9–27. 
28 Kim Lane Scheppele proposed handling the Hungarian and Polish cases jointly, ruling out the other country’s 
veto in each country’s case. Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Can Poland be Sanctioned by the EU?: Not Unless Hungary is 
Sanctioned Too,’ Verfassungsblog, October 24, 2016, <https://verfassungsblog.de/can-poland-be-sanctioned-
by-the-eu-not-unless-hungary-is-sanctioned-too/>. 
29 Albeit not a genuine reform, but an addition on the part of the Commission: the introduction of a ‘pre-Article 
7’ procedure, a rule of law mechanism. European Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law,’ Strasbourg, 11 March 2014, COM(2014) 158 final. 
30 Reverse Solange: Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Kottmann, Carlino Antpöhler, Johanna Dickschen, Simon 
Hentrei, and Maja Smrkolj, ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights Against EU Member 
States,’ Common Market Law Review 49 (2012): 489–520; systemic infringement: Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Enforcing 
the Basic Principle of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Procedures,’ in Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union, eds. Carlos Closa and Dimitry Kochenov (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016). 
31 In this paper we take it for granted that Article 2 values have a widely accepted meaning as exemplified by the 
broad consensus over violations in the cases of Hungary and Poland. We agree, however, that enforcing values 
(as the Treaty calls them) is of a different nature than the day-to-day examination of acquis compliance. ‘[T]he 
enforcement of values is a different matter compared with the enforcement of the acquis sensu stricto.’ 
Kochenov, ‘The Acquis and Its Principles…,’ 26. See also the discussion in Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, 375–77, on 
the conflict of values as opposed to conflict of (lower level) norms. 
32 For defining values, see, e.g., Dennis Davis, Alan Richter, and Cheryl Saunders, ‘Introduction,’ in An Inquiry into 
the Existence of Global Values: Through the Lens of Comparative Constitutional Law, eds. Dennis Davis, Alan 
Richter and Cheryl Saunders (Hart, London, 2015); Pierre Schlag, ‘Values,’ Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 6 
(1994): 219. 
33 Schlag, ‘Values,’ 221. 
 
of certain members of the community, reaffirming pre-existing inequalities and creating new 
ones, which can ultimately undermine the democratic order.34 That being said, there is a level 
of tolerance in a constitutional democracy for exclusive values to recognise group identities 
valuable to the group members, but only when these are outweighed by inclusive values. 
While inclusive values seek to cover everyone, exclusive values seek to differentiate and 
exclude some. Inclusive approaches, along with multicultural theories, seek inclusion to 
counteract inequalities inherent in ‘cultural membership’.35 In these theories, the state is 
never fully neutral, thanks to its majority biases. In this game every gain by the proponents of 
emergent authoritarianism translates to a loss on the side of constitutional democracy and 
the resulting inequalities need to be compensated for. However, accommodation of 
differences is limited and is only legitimate to the extent that it does not protect oppressive 
practices. Denial of recognising oppressive practices can in certain cases reduce pluralism (and 
might seem exclusive on the surface) but overall, such denials are inclusive, for they enforce 
equal membership. In the EU, Member States can and do in fact question the inclusive values 
of Article 2 TEU with reference to protecting their national identities. The EU is now faced with 
the dilemma of how far Member States can extend this right while still retaining their Union 
membership. 
In the game of values, every gain by the proponents of emergent authoritarianism translates 
to a loss for the side of constitutional democracy, hence ‘zero-sum’. While the recognition of 
both inclusive and exclusive values is common to constitutional democracies, we think that 
asserting a critical mass of exclusive values can lead to the hollowing out of the democratic 
order, both on national and supranational levels.36 What multiculturalist approaches teach us 
is that some level of toleration for exclusive values is a necessary and legitimate component 
of a liberal polity recognizing the values of diversity and pluralism, but also that policing the 
boundary between accommodation and rejection is central to the functioning and legitimacy 
of the regime. The line might be drawn differently in different polities or with regard to 
different groups, e.g., indigenous peoples might get more leeway than subnational units in a 
federation, but the underlying dilemma follows the same logic. 
A democratic political community is considered inclusive when it protects vulnerable minority 
identities and allows for said minorities to consider themselves part of the given political 
community. However, if a constitution one-sidedly favours the values and preferences of 
dominant groups, it does not fulfil the integrative function expected of democratic 
constitutions. In the latter case the state does not promise to take into account the interests 
of all citizens equally. As Kymlicka argues, ‘some self-government rights and polyethnic rights 
are consistent with, and indeed required by, liberal justice’.37 
Individual and collective minority rights are inclusive to the extent that they seek to make all 
citizens, including minority members, equal by compensating for their disadvantaged position 
and protecting them from majority decisions. Some groups are simply disadvantaged in the 
‘cultural market place’38 and ‘they could be outbid or outvoted on resource and policies’ that 
 
34 For an account on how exclusive values can ‘disunite a nation,’ see the volume Constitution for a Disunited 
Nation: Hungary’s New Fundamental Law, ed. Gábor Attila Tóth (CEU Press, New York/Budapest, 2012). 
35 Kymlicka, 1995: 110. 
36 Körtvélyesi, Majtényi, ‘Game of Values’ 1722. 
37 Kymlicka, 1995: 108. 
38 Kymlicka, 1995: 109. 
 
would be crucial to the survival of their minority identities.39 Of course, minority identities can 
also include exclusive elements; ‘some ethnic and national groups are deeply illiberal, and 
seek to supress rather than support the liberty of their members.’ 40  For example, the 
protection of minority practices such as FGM should be considered exclusive because they 
treat women as inferior and push them into a vulnerable position. 
State prioritisation of one or two specific languages inevitably leads to a loss of rights 
regarding minority languages. Let us take the example of a strong constitutional democracy 
like Canada. Canada gave constitutional recognition to two European languages (French and 
English) as official languages at the expense of other, most significantly, Aboriginal languages. 
What possible scenarios could this situation lead to? 
Let us model possible action based on the game between exclusive and inclusive values 
detailed above. The state could explicitly strengthen the exclusive value of the two languages, 
e.g., the Parliament could pass an Act prohibiting the official use of Aboriginal languages. Such 
a step would further weaken the principle of equality. Or the Parliament could decide to 
strengthen inclusive values and adopt an amendment that gives constitutional recognition to 
all languages which are spoken in Canada. It could also strengthen the protection of minority 
languages. These measures would weaken the exclusive character of the two European 
languages. (We will revisit the example of language protection later in this article through the 
case of the exclusive language policy of a federated state.) The weakening of inclusive values 
means domestic and European democratic institutions may become vulnerable. 
The Analogy of Liberal Multiculturalism 
Multicultural liberal democracies have, from their beginnings, faced the problem of how to 
accommodate illiberal minorities and to what extent the recognition of cultural differences 
can be justified. Liberal theories of multiculturalism (e.g., works of Joseph Raz, Charles Taylor, 
and Will Kymlicka) have extensively discussed this topic. Obviously, the EU is not a liberal 
multicultural federal state and Member States are not federated states. Nevertheless, we 
think that these cases are comparable and raise similar theoretical and practical questions and 
answers. Insights and experiences gained from one case can provide information about the 
other. 
We argue this analogy is applicable, because based on Raz’s triadic typology differentiating 
between liberal approaches built on toleration, non-discrimination or multiculturalism,41 the 
EU is built on a strong form of the acknowledgment of diversity. It does not simply require 
toleration of or non-discrimination of national disparities, but actively recognises differences 
and affirms nation states as bounded communities with varied constitutional cultures. With 
regards to these elements the EU is similar to a multiculturalist state. This also causes the EU 
to stretch the boundaries of traditional federalism,42 bringing it closer to federalisation driven 
 
39 Kymlicka, 1995: 109. 
40 Kymlicka, 1995: 75.   
41 Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective,’ in Joseph Raz: Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the 
Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995), 172–173. 
42 See typology in Sujit Choudhry and Nathan Hume: ‘Federalism, Devolution and Secession: From Classical to 
Post-conflict Federalism,’ in Comparative Constitutional Law, Research Handbooks in Comparative Law Series, 
eds. Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011). 
 
by the constant pressure of substate nationalism—a case where the multiculturalist approach 
is highly relevant.43 
Raz at one point calls the EU the ‘big brother’ of multiculturalism,44 or more precisely the big 
brother of liberal multicultural federal states. Multicultural theories, including those by 
Kymlicka and Raz, openly acknowledge their reliance on the example of European 
integration.45 Kymlicka seemingly uses integration projects like the European Community and 
NAFTA as a source of inspiration for his theory.46 It can seem like a strange twist to build on 
theories that dissect an area that these authors took inspiration from in the first place. Yet, 
their reliance on the European experiment does not mean that there is nothing to be learnt 
from these multiculturalist experiences. In fact, the presence of these references only 
underlines the structural similarities we also see and justifies the parallel we draw from the 
other direction. 
The parallel seems especially useful when it comes to discussing which types of national 
identities presented by Member States are justifiable and compatible with Article 2 TEU. It is 
important to underline that justification is always needed for limiting the national identity of 
Member States. As Tamás Győrfi argues: ‘We do not expect and cannot demand states to give 
up part of their authority without justification’.47 In light of this we need to find a scale to 
define the extent to which exclusive elements of national identity may be tolerated by the 
Member States’ legal systems. 
The dilemmas presented above can be seen as revisiting the old liberal dilemma on 
universality, pluralism, and the limits of toleration. In Jacob T. Levy’s pessimistic phrasing, 
liberalism either errs on the side of rationalism (universalism) or on the side of relativism.48 
When interpreting the Treaty on European Union, we can err on the former side with over-
demanding uniform standards (Article 2), or on the latter by allowing too much leeway on the 
national level (Article 4(2)). While we agree with Levy that a theoretically fully satisfying 
synthesis might not be available, we argue that a workable balance should be struck. Such a 
balance would maintain core elements (common values) under a principled and constrained 
standard and secure common ground, the lack of which would undermine integration. 
However, limitless toleration of anti-pluralism would undermine pluralism and cause serious 
difficulties in ulterior correction with devastating effects on democracy.49 
It is at this point that multiculturalist accounts engage with the dilemma in depth. They are 
willing to concede, if not defeat, but losses along the way, and they forcefully address the 
dilemmas of group recognition, value conflicts, managing diversity and the limits of toleration. 
 
43 This article does not discuss the literature of federalism, which has otherwise offered important insight into 
the dilemmas of Article 7, especially regarding the parallels to ‘subnational authoritarianism’. See R. Daniel 
Kelemen, ‘Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union,’ 
Government and Opposition 52, Special Issue 2 (Democracy without Solidarity: Political Dysfunction in Hard 
Times), (April 2017): 211–38. 
44 Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism,’ Ratio Juris 11, No. 3 (1998): 195. 
45 We would like to thank our anonymous reviewer for highlighting this aspect. 
46 Kymlicka, 1995: 168. 
47 Tamás Győrfi, ‘The Legitimacy of the European Human Rights Regime – A View from the United Kingdom,’ 
Global Constitutionalism 8, No. 1 (2019): 128. 
48 For a concise summary, see his concluding chapter, ‘Against Synthesis’. Jacob T. Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, 
and Freedom (Oxford University Press, New York, 2015), 283–95. 
49 In any case, the EU is not committed to full tolerance. As we have seen (unless we stick to the extreme relativist 
view) Article 2 does define certain substantive commonalities behind integration. 
 
Raz states ‘conflict is endemic to multiculturalism’, adding that this is in fact true of all forms 
of value pluralism.50 Levy agrees that this conflict flows from liberty, for it is liberty that 
‘generates pluralism, which generates norms, norm enforcement, and local power, which limit 
freedom’, even if ‘the ability to see freedom in our associational lives and power in the state 
all too often limits the ability to see power in associations and the possibility of freedom being 
enhanced by outside intervention—and vice versa.’51 
According to theories of liberal multiculturalism, the protection of group identities 
strengthens the equal dignity of persons belonging to these groups. With this argument these 
theories support not only tolerance, but also the recognition of cultural pluralism in a liberal 
framework. This is consistent with the wording of the Article 2, the second sentence of which 
declares that fundamental inclusive values of the European Union ‘are common to the Member 
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.’ The Article can be understood as defining the 
‘combined goals’ 52  of multiculturalism, recognising diversity and producing/maintaining 
equality. The multicultural reading of Article 2 is reinforced by the fact that Article 4(2) obliges 
the EU to live with difference53 at the collective level as well, like in a liberal multicultural state. 
In line with theories of multiculturalism, values that we call ‘inclusive’ (e.g., equality, dignity, 
‘respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’) should be 
ensured, and the recognition of national identity can come only after. Value pluralism in this 
liberal framework presumes that ‘there is a morality which applies to all the traditions and all 
the cultures, a morality which bridges the divide between them.’54 This universal morality 
defines how different moralities can be compatible in recognised communities to support the 
equality of various cultural groups. Universalism thus does not translate into cultural 
superiority: ‘At the heart of multiculturalism lies the recognition that universal values are 
realized in a variety of different ways in different cultures, and that they are all worthy of 
respect. This… is not to endorse all aspects of any culture. My culture no less than others is 
flawed.’55 
On the other hand, the protection of national identity with reference to shared history, 
culture, religion, language, etc., cannot override inclusive constitutional values in this 
theoretical framework. Raz describes liberal multicultural societies as a ‘harmonious 
coexistence of non-oppressive and tolerant communities’.56 Therefore, the ideology’s guiding 
principles are the rejection of oppression and mutual respect between cultural groups, as well 
as the primacy of inclusive values. However, in multicultural societies the primacy of inclusive 
values offers some level of tolerance to exclusive values in order to protect valuable group 
identities. Raz talks about the ‘dialectics of pluralism’ where incompatible values are not only 
 
50 Raz 1992: 37, labelling this a ‘non-utopian’ vision of multiculturalism. 
51 Levy 2015: 295. 
52 Charles Taylor, ‘Interculturalism or multiculturalism?’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 38, No. 4–5 (2012): 415. 
53 Charles Taylor, ‘Living with Difference,’ in Debating Democracy’s Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, 
and Public Philosophy, eds. Anita L. Allen and Jr Regan Milton C. (Oxford University Press, New York, 1998), 212–
26. 
54 Joseph Raz, ‘Moral Change and Social Relativism,’ in Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and 
Action (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), 181. 
55 Raz, ‘Multiculturalism,’ 204. 
56 Raz, ‘Multiculturalism,’ 199. 
 
present, but also worthwhile and recognised.57 Even if certain aspects seem hard to value and 
support, there might be reasons to still recognise these cultures: ‘even oppressive cultures 
can give people quite a lot, [so] one should be particularly wary of [campaigns against 
them].’58 
Interference with domestic structures will always raise the dilemma of whether intervention 
is justified or is an affront to the recognition of diversity. Raz lists three types of ‘liberal 
dilemmas’ with multiculturalism: oppression, superiority, and the necessity of a common 
culture.59 Raz stresses that the multiculturalist view he endorses is not ‘opposed [to] the 
change… on the contrary… multiculturalism insists that members of the different groups in a 
society should be aware of the different cultures in their society, and learn to appreciate their 
strengths and respect them. This in itself leads to inevitable developments,’ the pressure 
being higher in intolerant cultures.60 Like recognition under Article 4(2) in the case of the EU, 
the recognition of diversity in the case of multiculturalism serves a specific goal, ‘a concern 
for the [dignity and] well-being of the members of society.’61 Recognition remains conditional, 
resulting in an ‘uneasy alliance’ that sometimes supports proponents of diversity (like the 
sovereigntists in the case of the EU), ‘…while at others turning against them to impose ideals 
of toleration and mutual respect, or to protect the members of those very cultures against 
oppression by their own group.’62  
Possible Implications of the Background Theory 
Weaving together the three lines of our inquiry: Article 2 values are inclusive, but Article 4(2) 
raises the possibility of recognising exclusive values based on Member State choice. Applying 
the multiculturalist approach summarised above, the decision will imply a loss, while 
overriding national commitments will require justification. Our question is thus how the 
multiculturalist approach can help inform this debate. 
For example, using the concept of ‘nation’ in a Member State’s constitution is acceptable only 
if the legal order of the democratic political community respects the equal dignity and well-
being of every one of its citizens. The lawmaker thus cannot act against the moral equality of 
citizens and must exhibit equal attention to and respect toward each member of the political 
community.63 Relying on the premodern vision of the political nation that incorporates values 
influenced by state identity (e.g., faith and fidelity) without regard for the principle of equality 
(when only the members of a particular social class, e.g., nobility, workers, members of a 
caste, etc. may belong to the nation) naturally does not fulfil this demand. 
If we apply theories of multiculturalism to the institutional framework of the EU, we can state 
for instance that the Hungarian illiberal regime breaches the value system of the European 
Union: it builds the country’s national identity on the rejection of the primacy of inclusive 
values. The preamble of the Hungarian Fundamental Law, the ‘National Avowal of Faith’ 
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60 Raz, ‘Multiculturalism,’ 191. 
61 Raz, ‘Multiculturalism…,’ 185; see also Raz, ‘Multiculturalism,’ 197. 
62 Raz, ‘Multiculturalism…,’ 183. 
63 In Dworkin’s wording: ‘Political equality [and democracy] requires that political power be distributed so as to 
confirm the political community’s equal concern and respect for all its members.’ (emphasis added) Ronald 
Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Belknap, 2011), 391. 
 
provides an apt example to prove this point. It fails to mention equality as a value, but offers 
a list of exclusive values—such as belonging to a Christian church, belonging to the Hungarian 
ethnic nation, fidelity, faith and love—and along these lines it redefines the national identity 
of Hungary.64 It conveys that members of national or religious minorities are not equally part 
of the constitutional power, which violates the principle of mutual respect between cultural 
groups, as well as the primacy of inclusive values on which liberal multiculturalism is built. 
As discussed above, a critical mass of exclusive values undermines a legal system’s liberal core, 
i.e., the equal dignity of residents. Therefore, the exclusive values listed in the Hungarian 
Fundamental Law had a transforming effect on the country’s legal system. These exclusive 
values have made their marks in several areas. They are manifest in the Hungarian 
government’s attacks on the Central European University, the banning of gender studies MA 
programs in universities, the ‘Stop Soros’ law targeting human rights NGOs and asylum 
activists, and the criminalisation of homelessness in order to protect ‘cultural values’. The 
Hungarian case is illustrative in many ways. The vision of the national community and its 
members is cast in a culturally limited way (full of exclusive elements). Also, actual policies are 
increasingly defining parts of the population as enemies of the state. Finally, this concept is 
characterised by a constant search for enemies: according to the most common framing, this 
can mean foreign agents of an international pro-immigration liberal coalition with links to 
philanthropist George Soros and mainstream forces in Brussels, etc.65 
However, references to the protection of Member States’ national identity also exist that do 
not contradict Article 2 in this multicultural interpretation. For instance, there are 
nonexclusive arguments for Brexit on parliamentary supremacy being incompatible with 
European supremacies. Győrfi, among others, finds normative arguments for ‘the 
Commonwealth model of judicial review [that] has established a mechanism of human rights 
protection in which the legislature can disregard or override a court’s determination of what 
a human right requires.’66  
Brexit and the Hungarian public law crisis have common features: both are about national 
identity and self-identification of the people and their values, and both express a longing for 
stronger sovereignty (or ‘taking back control’ from the EU). The Brexit campaign exploited the 
loss of sovereignty by arguing that EU legislation, with the support of the Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg courts, restricts Member State institutions (i.e., parliaments and courts) and their 
sovereignty at an unacceptable level. Throughout the Brexit campaign these arguments were 
obviously mixed with unjustifiably exclusive, xenophobic discourses, e.g., the crusade against 
immigration. But even in this case, reclaiming the ability to decide nationally on who can enter 
the country seemed central.67 
 
64 Balázs Majtényi, ‘The Nation’s Will as Trump in the Hungarian Fundamental Law.’ In European Yearbook on 
Human Rights 15, ed. Wolfgang Benedek et al. (Intersentia, Antwerpen/Wien/Graz, 2015), 247–60. 
65 Balázs Majtényi, Ákos Kopper, and Pál Susánszky, ‘Constitutional Othering, Ambiguity and Subjective Risks of 
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66 Tamás Győrfi, ‘The legitimacy of the European human rights regime–a view from the United Kingdom,’ Global 
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As demonstrated, two kinds of references to the protection of national identity can exist: 
those that violate the multiculturalist interpretation of the relationship between Article 2 and 
Article 4(2) and those that do not. Taking a critical stance against the EU when it comes to 
defining national identity can be perfectly acceptable (exercising sovereignty by making 
otherwise legitimate decisions). But the same act becomes impermissible when used to exert 
sovereignty to lower the level of protection for inclusive values. 
The practice adopted by liberal multicultural federal states—especially the way it affects 
recognised territorial communities—could also help conceptualise the enforcement of Article 
2 values. Quebec’s Bill 101, the Charter of the French Language adopted in 197668 provides a 
good example of what we call a clash between exclusive and inclusive values. The legislation 
limited the language rights of the province’s Anglophone and Allophone population by 
declaring French the only official language (used by legislature, courts, government 
institutions, public schools, commerce and business sectors) and turned against the Canadian 
federal constitutional vision of the cultural mosaic. 69  Among other restrictions, Bill 101 
severely limited the possibility of English language instruction in the province. The central 
argument for this was the protection of the French language—inherent to the Quebec 
culture— against the domination of English. 
The Supreme Court of Canada rendered several judgements on Quebec’s Bill 101. In its first 
famous decision in Quebec v. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards (1984), the 
Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the Bill’s provision about French language instruction 
violated Section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982).70 This section 
guarantees minority language educational rights to French-speaking citizens outside Quebec, 
and to English-speaking citizens in Quebec. However, because the scope of Section 23 is 
limited to Canadian citizens only (and mainly to those whose first language is English or 
French), immigrants and Allophones were not properly protected by the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms against the exclusive aspirations of Quebec’s legislation and policies. 
The struggle continued. The Supreme Court’s actions were often followed by further 
restrictive steps by Quebec, e.g., when the Charter of the French Language was amended by 
Bill 104 in 2002. This modification reacted to the practice that sought to circumvent the 
restrictions of the original Bill: Allophone children could gain access to English-language 
education in public schools after a brief English-language education at a private school 
(‘bridging schools’). To further restrict the language rights of Allophone children, Section 3 of 
Bill 104 added the following to Section 73 of Bill 101: ‘instruction received in English in Quebec 
in a private educational institution not accredited for the purposes of subsidies by the child 
for whom the request is made, or by a brother or sister of the child, shall be disregarded.’71 In 
the Nguyen v. Quebec (2009) case72 the Supreme Court of Canada declared that Bill 104 is 
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unconstitutional because it infringes on minority language education rights. This series of 
cases demonstrates how a liberal polity can set principled limits on restrictive policies in a sub-
entity that invokes existential challenges and identity arguments. 
It might be apparent that the parallel with the EU is more defined when we examine 
recognised territorial units (i.e., autonomous areas or federated states) in constitutional 
democracies and probably even in the case of indigenous or other minority communities who 
control a given territory. It also remains true that compared to the EU, there are important 
differences: the state still seems to be the central locus of conducting politics and taking 
collective responsibility. That being said, debates on sovereignty and national identity in 
certain constitutional democracies liken these cases more to the EU than generally assumed, 
see, e.g., the (historical and contemporary) discussions on the status of states in the US.73 
Crucially, the dilemma of recognising strong identity claims unites the two sets of cases. The 
EU is faced with diversity challenging some of its fundamental tenets, a key concern for 
multiculturalists considering responses to illiberalism. This is where our parallel is most 
incisive. 
We have seen that Canada has been grappling with policing the boundaries of accommodation 
(not only with regard to Quebec, but also concerning its indigenous and immigrant 
populations), an experience that has led to the emergence of working standards. Kymlicka 
built a widely cited theory on the Canadian example, one which sets out straightforward 
principles for when liberal interference is justified. A similar elaboration for the EU is missing. 
In the next section, we revisit Kymlicka’s normative framework to see what insights it offers 
for the illiberal challenge in Europe. 
Kymlicka’s Account of Liberal Interference with Illiberal Minorities 
The central dilemma, shared by the multiculturalist and the supranationalist setting, is the 
point at which illiberal deviation should cease to be tolerated and when liberal interference is 
legitimate. Will Kymlicka addressed the problem of illiberal minorities in his 1995 book 
Multicultural Citizenship, an account that can help us operationalise the dilemma.74 Kymlicka 
lists the following points that should be considered when assessing the legitimacy of 
interference: 
1) ‘the severity of rights violations’; 
2) ‘the degree of consensus within the community on the legitimacy of restricting individual 
rights’; 
3) ‘the ability of dissenting group members to leave the community if they so desire’; 
4) ‘the existence of historical agreements’.75 (emphases added) 
The severity argument sounds rather straightforward and would form part of any assessment 
of the legitimacy of interference. It is in fact a key part of Article 7 TEU itself (‘serious breach’). 
What the multiculturalist approach helps to better capture is the protection of the liberal core, 
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against which pluralism can play out. This is the moral equality underlying inclusive values, 
most importantly: democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The more a legal regime 
manifests the wholescale rejection of this core (possibly leading to destructive pluralism), the 
more likely any liberal interference countering these tendencies will be justified.76 In the case 
of Hungary, measures that target opposition-held local governments, NGOs, academic 
institutions and individuals that are critical of the government, can be seen as violations of all 
three values. 
Less obvious is the second consideration, on how wide the support for restrictions is. While 
this might feature as a hidden political motive when deciding on political action, it makes 
sense to give more leeway for deviations where these are sustained and deeply held 
commitments of the community, shared by most, as opposed to forged and momentary 
preferences seeking exemptions for gains by the elite. Deciding what counts as sincere, 
consensual conviction in a society is no easy task. (It seems no less paradoxical than trying to 
assess the genuineness of religious views, a move often considered intrusive in the process of 
testing the legitimacy of intrusion.) For example, in a less-than-democratic society, the 
government’s sustained efforts to curtail media pluralism can raise suspicions in this respect. 
In the Hungarian case, these were the first series of measures that raised international 
attention related to regulating the media. That was also the case that inspired the reverse 
Solange proposal. 
Third is the exit option. On one level, this could be read as a requirement that citizens 
(residents) should be able to leave the country and as such its restrictions behind. Such moves 
always have costs but are certainly available, as seen above. In fact, with the most dissatisfied 
members of the community leaving,77 this option can end up reinforcing internal cohesion and 
consensus around the restrictions (point 2 above). Raz rightly notes that a multicultural setting 
can strengthen restrictive traces. 78  In Kymlicka’s view, if people are free to leave the 
community, more pressing arguments are needed to interfere with oppressive practices. This 
might mean the physical aspect of opting out, now guaranteed under free movement rules. 
(In fact, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians have been making use of this right when they 
have opted to live in other EU Member States.79) It can also refer to the ability of residents 
(especially in the case of a state) to be able to leave the cultural community, meaning the 
majority as envisioned in public law norms, including the constitution. And the costs of this 
choice should not be prohibitive.  
The exit option can also be applied on another level: if a group is more justified in asking for 
adherence to its common values when members are free to leave, this should apply equally 
(or even more strongly) to the EU. Member States are free to leave if they disagree over key 
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elements of cooperation. Depending on how prohibitive the terms of leaving are (see the 
Brexit saga), this can tilt the field toward more or less legitimate expectations of members. 
Fourth, Kymlicka states that what arrangements have governed the relations of the two 
entities in question—the EU and its Member State in our case—should matter. For example, 
new Member States by and large joined the EU under the current rules, including the ‘depth’ 
of integration and Article 2 values. Countries like the UK, on the other hand, could voice their 
opposition throughout the deepening of the integration and the process of encompassing 
political aspects in addition to economic issues. 
There is a fifth consideration that Kymlicka discusses outside his original typology, namely the 
‘newcomers’ argument. According to Kymlicka, pressures for change are more legitimate 
when applied to newly arriving immigrant groups.80 We connect this to the fourth element, as 
the fact of new arrival can be taken as a different type of arrangement. Applied to the EU, this 
would mean measures like the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, as an added layer of 
conditionality, post-accession, for ‘newcomers’ Bulgaria and Romania. 
Beyond the list above, Kymlicka also discusses ways of responding to violations. He advises 
speaking out against them, supporting those who can help overcome them, and creating 
incentives for leaving them behind, including stronger guarantees of human rights.81 The 
latter, he says, is a means of possible liberal interference without hard sanctions—the type 
Raz also favours when available. 
What follows from this for the EU? The legitimacy of interference with illiberal regimes 
depends on a number of factors. The most uncontroversial will be the severity of the 
violations. Kymlicka also suggests taking into account the level of domestic support for 
restrictions and the ability of group members to opt out (the exit option on the level of the 
individual). Both underline the importance of democratic will-formation at the domestic level 
and room for dissent. If pluralism suffers because opt-out from illiberalism is too costly, e.g., 
one has to leave physically or is targeted or even pushed out for being considered disloyal to 
the regime (‘traitors of the nation’), claiming democratic legitimacy will become problematic. 
The legitimacy of liberal interference is supported by two further aspects: accession to and 
participation in the EU (consent) where leaving is an available option (the exit option on the 
level of member states). In our view, the most problematic element of Kymlicka’s framework 
is this differentiation based on the length of membership. Choudhry questions the grounds 
for the distinction because the community-based arguments that apply to national and 
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indigenous groups seem applicable to immigrant communities, and hence normative 
distinction is incoherent.82 The problem of double standards is even more problematic in the 
case of EU Member States: if we want to interfere on liberal multiculturalist grounds, strong 
and consistent reasons should be provided. In the EU, distinctions between old member states 
and newcomers would undermine the legitimacy of liberal interference. How could sanctions 
in the name of inclusive values rest on rules that single out, exclusively, some states only 
because they joined later? The lost sense of fairness could undercut the effectiveness of the 
entire framework. 
More considerations and examples could be added, but this brief overview should suffice to 
illustrate how insights from multiculturalist theories can help us conceptualise and 
operationalise the question of legitimate interference in cases of oppressive measures. 
Conclusions 
In this article we proposed the application of theories of liberal multiculturalism as a 
normative background theory in addressing the dilemma raised by the anti-constitutionalist 
challenge in the European Union. This normative framework could help protect liberal 
democracy within Member States and on the EU level alike. To conduct this analysis, we argue 
that it is possible to compare the challenge of illiberal Member States in the European Union 
to the problem of illiberal policies and legislations of federated states in liberal multicultural 
federal states. We believe that this approach and the lessons learnt from how liberal 
multicultural states function can enrich the debate on constitutional pluralism with a clear 
focus on the recognition of cultural communities. It could also help conceptualise the 
enforcement of Article 2 TEU values and interpret its relationship to the protection of national 
identities as cited by Article 4(2) as well as the assessments under Article 7 TEU in a way that 
supports inclusive constitutional values. 
Relying on this multiculturalist account, we can judge not only the main challenges in the EU 
(e.g., Brexit, or the Hungarian public law crises), but also the justifiability of different Member 
State arguments, policies and legislations regarding the protection of their national identities. 
These arguments, policies and legislations range from the UK’s defending parliamentary 
supremacy against Europe to populist governments aiming to protect national identity from 
humanitarian and human rights NGOs. 
The multiculturalist approach helps us identify key elements of the balancing exercise, 
including the severity of the violations measured against core commitments; the level of 
domestic support (in cases where public discourse is still open, plural, and democratic); the 
costs of both physically and ‘culturally’ opting out of the community (compared to the costs 
of the country leaving the EU); and finally the possible history of reservations and good-faith 
attempts at renegotiating the terms of membership. The multiculturalist framework suggests 
that in terms of the means applied by liberal interference, methods that least curtail pluralism 
are preferred over harsher measures. 
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